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Abstract There is a strong tendency in mainstream literature to discuss cross-strait 
relations in terms of security threats or growing economic interdependence. On the other 
hand, cultural exchanges have received considerably less attention. Nonetheless, scholars that 
do elaborate on culture conceptualise culture as a fixed set of norms and values that fosters 
mutual understanding. Similarly, cultural exchanges between the National Palace Museum 
(NPM) in Taipei and the Palace Museum (PM) in Beijing are lauded as signs of warming 
cross-strait ties. Michelle Jana Chan (2010) remarked that the museum directors have risen 
above politics to organise their first joint exhibition in 2009. Yet, this thesis argues that 
politics is firmly rooted in cultural exchanges across the Strait. Taiwanese and Chinese 
governments have purposefully (re)constructed culture to determine what “true” culture 
entails, what goal it serves and what it says about the relationship between people on both 
sides of the Strait. From a poststructuralist outlook, multiple truths need to be elucidated as 
“the truth” does not exist. Presidential statements and documentaries about the NPM are 
analysed from a spatial perspective to explain how culture and the NPM are constructed 
through the ‘One China’ discourses and the ‘Taiwan-centric’ discourse, struggling to define 
communities, boundaries and realities rooted in the broader background of the collaborations 
between the NPM and the PM. This study contends that competing and changing meanings 
and purposes of culture embedded in these cultural exchanges are the result of power 
struggles and should be acknowledged as sources of conflict in cross-strait relations. 
 
Keywords Cross-strait relations; cultural exchanges; National Palace Museum; Palace 
Museum; poststructuralism. 
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1. Introduction 
Since Kuomintang President Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, relations between China and 
Taiwan seem to be friendlier than ever. As a result, economic exchanges have been growing 
at a rapid pace. Yet, on 18 March last year, economic integration between the two neighbours 
experienced a backlash. The Sunflower Movement, consisting mainly of Taiwanese students, 
occupied the Legislative Yuan in Taipei against the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement 
that initiates mutual opening of service sectors (Aljazeera, 2014). Demonstrators expressed 
grave concern about China’s rising dominance in Taiwan and underlined the undemocratic 
and opaque nature of the negotiations between the Nationalist Party Kuomintang (KMT) and 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the signing of the trade pact (ibid.). While many argue 
that enhanced economic interdependence prevents the politically tense situation from 
escalating, this turning point reveals that economic cooperation between the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC, China or Mainland) and the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) 
cannot continue unrestricted (Beeson and Li, 2012, p.47; Chan, 2009, p.438, 459).  
  These complex relations between the PRC and the ROC are also referred to as cross-
strait relations, named after the Taiwan Strait that separates China and Taiwan. This 
continuing unease between the two countries is the result of the Chinese Civil War that ended 
in 1949 and forced the KMT to resettle in Taiwan after their defeat by the CCP on the 
Mainland (Chen, 2012, p.317). Until this very day, the sovereignty battle between the two 
parties remains unsettled (ibid.). Nonetheless, the “1992 Consensus”, underlining the mutual 
acknowledgement of “One China” albeit a flexible definition of what “One China” entails, 
created a more acceptable environment for KMT-CCP negotiations (Chen, 2012, p.322; 
Tsang, 2012, p.389, Shirk, 2007, p.184, 186, 200).  
   The increasing cross-strait economic exchanges since 2008 have caught the attention 
of many scholars and journalists. Cultural exchanges, on the other hand, have been largely 
overlooked. This study challenges the current debate about cross-strait relations by 
emphasising the importance of analysing cultural exchanges and the competing meanings and 
purposes of culture that have hitherto been underestimated. Generally speaking, cultural 
exchanges are deemed uncontroversial and believed to foster people-to-people relationships 
and mutual understanding between countries (Chen, Hwang and Ling, 2009, p.750-754; 
Lapid, 1996, p.7; Mark, 2009, p.22). However, culture and cultural exchanges should be 
recognised as value-laden tools that serve political interests in cross-strait relations (Hong, 
1997, p.73; Hwang, 2014, p.77). Cultural exchanges need to be closely observed as these may 
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not only give rise to agreements, but also conflicts of interests between (and in) China and 
Taiwan. This line of thought makes it relevant to consider the following research question: 
“How are cultural exchanges between the ROC and PRC politicised and how do these 
indicate signs of contestation in cross-strait relations?” 
  The scope of this research is limited to the exchange of artefacts between the National 
Palace Museum (NPM) in Taipei and the Palace Museum (PM) in Beijing. In October 2009, 
the PM and the NPM launched their first joint exhibition in Taipei since part of the PM 
collection moved to Taiwan in 1949 (Chou, 2010, p.179). Various newspapers lauded the 
exhibition ‘Harmony and Integrity: The Yongzheng Emperor and His Times’ as a milestone 
and sign of warming cross-strait relations (Fang, 2009; Jou, 2011; Sui, 2009). Besides 
shedding light on the apparent difficulties between the museums regarding the “National” part 
in the NPM’s name and the PM’s failure to officially guarantee the return of artefacts to the 
NPM, news reporters failed to discuss the politicised nature of the exchanges (Jacobs, 2011; 
Kazer & Hsu, 2013; Sui, 2009; Taipei Times, 2013). This study is based on a discourse 
analysis on the broader background of the cultural exchanges between the Palace Museums. 
This approach is taken to go beyond the available information on the joint exhibitions which 
only highlights the cooperative character of the museum collaborations. Therefore, 
presidential statements on culture and documentaries about the NPM are analysed to clarify 
how meanings and purposes of culture and the NPM are politicised and constructed through 
various discourses, rooted in the broader background of the cultural exchanges between the 
two museums.  
  More specifically, Taiwanese and Chinese governments have purposefully (re)shaped 
culture through the Chinese ‘One China’ discourse, the Taiwanese ‘One China’ discourse and 
the ‘Taiwan-centric’ discourse, to determine what “true” culture entails, what goal it serves 
and what it says about the relationship between China and Taiwan. Central to this research is 
the poststructuralist assumption that multiple truths need to be elucidated as “the truth” does 
not exist (Devetak, 2005, p.164; Foucault, 1991a, p.118). This analysis discloses the ways in 
which competing discourses create realities and spatial representations that may overlap and 
differ, agree and disagree. The varying meanings attached to culture and embedded in the 
cultural exchanges between the NPM and the PM are the result of power struggles and need to 
be understood as sources of conflict across the Strait. This opposes the common idea of 
culture and cultural exchanges as unproblematic and diplomatic tools to ensure enhanced 
understanding.  
  The thesis starts with a literature review on a wide range of academic work concerning 
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cross-strait relations, the role of culture and cultural exchanges in IR, the Chinese and 
Taiwanese construction of culture, and museum studies. The third section discusses the 
methodology and the research design used to conduct discourse analysis. This is followed by 
an overview and explanation of the three discourses at play, namely the Chinese ‘One China’ 
discourse, the Taiwanese ‘One China’ discourse and the ‘Taiwan-centric’ discourse. The next 
section analyses the competing discourses and conceptualisations of culture embedded in the 
presidential statements on culture and documentaries about the NPM from a spatial 
perspective. In conclusion, the key findings of this study are summarised and suggestions for 
future research are provided.  
2. Literature review 
Cross-strait relations have been widely discussed in defensive realist terms, underlining the 
security dilemma between Taiwan, China and the United States (Lee, 2013; Shirk, 2007; 
Chen, 2012). The PRC conducted missile exercises in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-1996, and 
adopted the Anti-Secession Law in 2005 to display its readiness to take non-peaceful 
measures to counter Taiwanese separatist efforts (Chen, 2012, p.325-326, 331). Taiwan’s 
proclamation of de jure independence would equate to a declaration of war, as it would 
compel China to respond with military means to remain credible (Shirk, 2007, p.185; Tsang, 
2012, p.396; Courmont, 2011, p.507). Additionally, the United States plays a central, albeit 
difficult, role in cross-strait relations as it has to ease China’s insecurities and at the same time 
safeguard Taiwan against any use of force, as stated in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 
(Lee, 2013, p.80, 85; Shirk, 2007, p.185, 192).  
  Nevertheless, there has been a growing perception that this security dilemma is 
unlikely to escalate due to enhanced economic interdependence (Lee, 2013, p.81; Beeson & 
Li, 2012, p.47; Bush, 2005, p.171). Chinese and Taiwanese businesspeople would be too 
reluctant to give up these strong economic ties (Beeson & Li, 2012, p.47; Chan, 2009, p.438, 
444, 459). Yet, there are serious concerns in Taiwanese society that economic 
interdependence will bind Taiwanese companies to China’s economy, hollow out Taiwan’s 
economy and eventually make reunification with the PRC inevitable (Lee, 2013, p.81-82; 
Bush, 2005, p.174). Last year, the Sunflower Movement expressed its discomfort about 
China’s rising dominance in Taiwan and protested against the Cross-Strait Service Trade 
agreement (Aljazeera, 2014).  
  In these debates about cross-strait relations, many focused on state (in)security and/or 
growing economic exchanges. As a result, cultural exchanges and culture have received 
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considerably less attention. Generally, those who do elaborate on the exchange of cultural 
values and ideas assume it to be uncontroversial; fostering people-to-people relationships and 
mutual understanding between countries (Chen, Hwang and Ling, 2009, p.750-754; Lapid, 
1996, p.7; Von Maltzahn, 2013, p.6; Mark, 2009, p.22, 35). Both Chinese and Taiwanese 
government officials highlighted that common culture may improve overall cooperation in the 
context of cross-strait relations. Since the “1992 Consensus”, cultural exchanges have 
officially been included in the mutual political agenda to enhance interaction and 
understanding (Yang & Li, 1992 in Hong, 1997, p.77; Von Maltzahn, 2013, p.6; Mark, 2009, 
p.35). Former president of the PRC, Hu Jintao, and current president of the ROC, Ma Ying-
jeou, underlined that a solution to the cross-strait issue can be found based on the strong ties 
rooted in Chinese traditional culture and shared history (Bush, 2013, p.78, 79). 
  However, rather than simply enhancing understanding, culture and cultural exchanges 
need to be recognised as value-laden tools that serve political interests and may cause 
conflicts between the PRC and the ROC (Hong, 1997, p.73; Hwang, 2014, p.77). In China, 
the CCP has always argued that the Chinese nation needs to be reunified because Taiwanese 
and Chinese people share common ancestry, blood, and Han culture (Brown, 2004, p.24; 
Rigger, 1997, p.308, 310). The situation in the ROC has been more volatile. The turbulent 
national identity politics since the resettlement of the KMT in Taiwan have been widely 
discussed (Lynch, 2004; Hwang, 2014; Wang, 2014; Shih, 2012; Brown, 2004; Chen, Hwang, 
Ling, 2009; Rigger, 1997). Until the 1970s the Nationalists enforced intense sinification, 
encouraging the superior status of Chinese culture, while denigrating every form of 
Taiwanese or indigenous cultural expression (Lynch, 2004, p.515; Chang, 2004, p.3; Chen, 
Hwang and Ling, 2009, p.755). In response, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
promoted desinification to emphasise the uniqueness of Taiwanese culture and identity, 
(Chang, 2004, p.3-6, 11; Liu & Hung, 2002, p.568, 570, 571; Wang & Lu, 2008, p.432).  
  From the end of the 1970s onwards the KMT’s mentality has moved from a purely 
China-centric focus to one increasingly promoting Taiwan as a distinct community (Chang, 
2004, p.3; Lynch, 2004, p.515). This so-called Taiwanese consciousness or process of 
Taiwanisation has been embraced by all political parties (including the KMT and the DPP) 
and has become the norm on the island (ibid.). While President Ma continued to emphasise 
Taiwan as the standard-bearer of Chinese culture, he repeatedly highlighted Taiwanese 
people’s unique democratic lifestyle that stands in sharp contrast to the political situation on 
the Mainland (Bush, 2013, p.79). As time passes, the conflicting social and political identities 
between Taiwanese and Chinese people become increasingly apparent (Brown, 2004, p.2, 
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245; Li, 2014, p.133; Hwang, 2014, p.72).  
  Constructivists recognise that culture plays a role, albeit not a central one, in shaping 
interests, actions and identity (Reus-smit, 2005, p.210). Kuniko Ashizawa (2008) pointed out 
that social experiences and interactions are essential and more important than culture in 
constructing identity (p.575). Many in this field argue that self-identity is vital for a state as it 
serves as a guidebook to define national interests, preferences and legitimate state actions 
(Steele, 2005, p.535, 537; Weldes, 1996, p.282, 287, 303; Ashizawa, 2008, p.574-575). 
Nonetheless, these studies tend to view culture as a fixed set of norms and values and 
underestimate the significance of culture as meanings and interpretations that are driven by 
political interests, and constructed to determine how one perceives the world and what is 
(in)appropriate (Avruch, 1998, p.15, 30; Spiro in Ross, 2009, p.155-156). This is exactly 
where poststructuralist scholars come into play as they have great interest in researching how 
these meanings of culture are negotiated, shaped and turned into commonly accepted 
knowledge. In cross-strait relations, culture has been (re)constructed in different ways as a 
result of power battles to determine what “true” culture is and means for Taiwanese people, 
and what role it plays in everyday life (Foucault, 1991a, p.131-132).  
  According to poststructuralists there are multiple versions of “true” knowledge that are 
produced within discourses (ibid. p.118; Devetak, 2005, p.164). Therefore, rather than 
searching for “the truth”, one should study how various Taiwanese and Chinese 
representations of social reality are constructed to make sense of current and past cross-strait 
relations. Competing discourses of what culture entails and what purpose it serves need to be 
analysed to understand how these meanings are shaped and in what ways these are 
(in)compatible. The CCP has always relied on common Chinese culture on both sides of the 
Strait to create proximity and encourage reunification. The KMT and the DPP, on the other 
hand, have attached different meanings to culture, emphasising Taiwanese consciousness to 
distance Taiwan from China and to be distinct from the Mainland (albeit DPP on a more far-
reaching scale). Keeping in mind the difficulties and disagreements in defining what 
constitutes and distinguishes Chinese and Taiwanese culture, culture is far from static or 
stable. 
   As Allen Chun (1994) explained, culture is constantly (re)shaped to create “a sense of 
history, feelings of national consciousness, shared political ideology, conceptual worldview, 
values of civilization, and habits of custom” (p.49, p.52). When worldviews embedded in the 
definitions of culture are incompatible these may lead to public confrontations or what James 
Hunter (1991) referred to as culture wars (Dubin, 2006, p.477). Accordingly, museums acts as 
  s1484095 
6 
 
battlefields on which culture wars are fought between competing voices that either end up 
being ignored or represented (Kaplan, 2006, p.165; Dubin, 2006, p.478; McLean, 2005, p.1). 
Critical museum studies have widely acknowledged the politicised character of museums as 
sites of contestation, persuasion and representation (Mason, 2006, p.22-23; Shambaugh Elliot 
and Shambaugh, 2005 p.109; Kaplan, 2006, p.165). The ROC and PRC government both used 
the Palace Museum (PM) and other museums as powerful tools to control and display 
meanings of culture, to stimulate nationalism, and to claim moral and political legitimacy 
(Lee, 2007, p.175; Hamlish, 1995, p.20).  
  Between December 1948 and February 1949, almost four thousand crates of PM 
artefacts were moved to Taiwan as the Nationalist government was forced to leave the 
Mainland (Shambaugh Elliot and Shambaugh, 2005, p.95). Authorities on both sides of the 
Strait turned to the PM’s imperial collection to gain national and international recognition 
(Shambaugh Elliot and Shambaugh, 2005, p.102, 108; Kaplan, 2006, p.160). In 1961, the 
ROC sent Chinese imperial artefacts to the U.S. to express how determined free China 
[Taiwan] was to safeguard traditional Chinese culture and to win back the Mainland from the 
Communists (Shambaugh Elliot and Shambaugh, 2005, p.102). In response to the PRC’s 
rising global influence, the Nationalists established the National Palace Museum in Taipei in 
1965 to solidify their political and cultural legitimacy and to justify the ROC as the just ruler 
of the Chinese nation (Lee, 2007, p.178; Hamlish, 1995, p.22). From 1974 on, the PRC 
started to lend pieces from the PM collection to the U.S. to foster diplomatic relations 
(Kaplan, 2006, p.160). It was a serious setback for the KMT when the U.S. decided to 
recognise the PRC, instead of the ROC, as the legitimate government of China in 1979 (Chen, 
2012, p.319). Nevertheless, this did not stop the KMT from using the NPM to uphold the 
image of Taiwan as the protector of traditional Chinese culture (Lee, 2007, p.178; Hamlish, 
1995, p.22; Shambaugh Elliott and Shambaugh, 2005, p.95-97).  
  What is problematic about mainstream literature on cross-strait relations is that it 
overlooks the political nature of cultural exchanges, including museum collaborations, and 
culture. This study challenges the current debate by taking the literature on critical museum 
studies and poststructuralism as a basis to elaborate on the construction of contested meanings 
and purposes of culture embedded in the cultural exchanges between China and Taiwan. 
Moreover, cultural exchanges are recognised as sources of conflict in cross-strait relations and 
the meanings of culture are perceived as outcomes of political power struggles between the 
PRC and the ROC, but also within Taiwan. It is of major importance to keep a close eye on 
  s1484095 
7 
 
these exchanges as escalation of the cross-strait relations could result in war and have global 
consequences (Tsang, 2012, p.369; Courmont, 2011, p.507; Chu & Nathan, 2007, p.89). 
3. Methodology 
Cultural exchanges between the National Palace Museum and the Palace Museum have 
required both sides to define, present and promote Chinese and Taiwanese culture in a certain 
fashion. The conceptualisation of what constitutes and differentiates Chinese culture and 
Taiwanese culture has fuelled a continuous debate in Taiwan and between Taiwan and China. 
Central to this research is the assumption that culture matters in studying cross-strait relations, 
not only as a fixed set of shared norms and behaviours, but also as a changing set of 
politicised meanings and interpretations (Avruch, 1998, p.15, 30; Spiro in Ross, 2009, p.155-
156). In this sense, culture frames how one perceives the world and what one believes to be 
(in)appropriate and true.  
  The ROC and the PRC have both put effort into (re)constructing culture to determine 
what “true” culture entails. These shifting and competing perceptions of what culture means, 
what purpose it serves and what it says about the relationship between China and Taiwan are 
reflected in museums and their collections. Critical museum studies have shown that 
museums act as platforms where groups of people challenge on another to (re)define who they 
are as a society and nation by institutionalising culture and categorising communities into 
insiders and outsiders (Kaplan, 2006, p.165; Hamlish, 1995, p.28; Dubin, 2006, p.479; Lee, 
2007, p.173). In other words, museums do not only acts as “symbolic institutions” but are also 
“powerful mechanisms of community imaginaries in modern society” (Lee, 2007, p.173).  
The KMT and the CCP both used the Chinese imperial collection as an instrument to control 
and display meanings of “true” culture, to stimulate nationalism, and to claim moral and 
political legitimacy (ibid. p.175; Hamlish, 1995, p.20). 
  This paper takes a post-positivist stance and argues that “the objective truth” does not 
exist as “true” knowledge is subjectively produced within discourses (Devetak, 2005, p.164; 
Foucault, 1991a, p.118). Poststructuralists see discourses as “framings of meaning and lenses 
of interpretation” (Hansen, 2006, p.6). Instead of searching for “the truth”, one should analyse 
different discourses, a variety of “terms, assumptions, labels, categories and narratives”, used 
to define culture and create multiple social realities in Taiwan (Jackson, 2007, p.394). While a 
discourse seems to be coherent and stable, it is constantly challenged by other discourses 
willing to shape “reality” (Doty, 1993, p.302-303; Hansen, 2006, p.18; Jackson, 2007, p.396). 
A discourse essentially “silences other modes of representations” and “requires continuous 
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articulation and re-articulation” (Jackson, 2007, p.396). Furthermore, language itself is 
unstable as it relies on subjectively constructed differences and oppositions in relation to the 
other to be meaningful (Devetak, 2005, p.167; Derrida, 1978, p.272). Nevertheless, power is 
capable of producing effects of stability as it dictates what interpretations are legitimate/real, 
and what is placed in the inside/centre or outside/margin (Doty, 1997, p.379; Foucault, 1991b, 
p.93; Derrida, 2003, p.105).  
  This positioning of the Other in relation to the Self is established through spatial 
representations in discourse that set boundaries and delimit space (Chilton, 2004, p.52, 57-58; 
Hansen, 2006, p.42). These boundaries do not only signify geographic closeness or 
remoteness to the Self but also social and geopolitical distance between “we, us, our” and 
“they, them, their” (Chilton, 2004, p.56-57). This thesis underscores that the Self-Other 
relationship between Taiwan and China is not exclusively defined by portraying the Other as 
radically different but also though various “degrees of Otherness” (Hansen, 2006, p.6, 33). 
Space metaphors such as ‘close allies’, ‘close cooperation’, ‘distant relations’ and ‘remote 
connection’, play a vital role in conceptualising these relational positions ranging from close 
to distant, centre to periphery and insider to outsider (ibid. p.52,58). These value-laden 
classifications are likely to give rise to disagreements between competing discourses in 
Taiwan and between Taiwan and China.  
 
 
 
  In order to visualise the defined research scope and how discourse analysis is 
conducted, Figure 2 gives an overview of the research design. This study focuses on cross-
strait cultural exchanges between the PRC and the ROC and the PM and the NPM in 
particular. Presidential statements on culture and documentaries about the NPM are analysed 
from a spatial perspective to expose how culture and the NPM are constructed through official 
CCP, KMT, and DPP discourses. A closer look is taken at the spatial representations to 
highlight how Taiwan and China geopolitically, socially and geographically distance 
themselves from one another by emphasising cultural differences and/or create proximity by 
underlining shared cultural elements. The Chinese ‘One China’ discourse, the Taiwanese 
CROSS-STRAIT CULTURAL EXCHANGES 
Intertextual model Number of discourses Spatial perspective 
Official discourse  
(presidential statements 
+ documentaries)  
1. Chinese ‘One China’ 
2. Taiwanese ‘One China’ 
3. Taiwanese ‘Taiwan-centric’  
 
Geopolitical, social, geographic  
distance and/or proximity between  
PRC - ROC, Chinese - Taiwanese, PM - NPM 
 
Figure 2: Research design for discourse analysis 
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‘One China’ discourse and the ‘Taiwan-centric’ discourse are explained to illustrate the power 
struggle to define communities, boundaries and realities rooted in the broader background of 
the exchanges between the two museums.  
  In this respect, museums need to be recognised as sites of persuasion, representation 
and contestation (Mason, 2006, p.22-23; Shambaugh Elliot and Shambaugh, 2005 p.109; 
Kaplan, 2006, p.165). Politics and the Chinese imperial collection have always been 
intimately linked and this is unlikely to change (Shambaugh Elliot and Shambaugh, 2005, 
p.109; Vickers, 2010, p.106; Watson, 1995, p.10). What is more, the competing, and at times 
incompatible, meanings and purposes of culture embedded in these cultural exchanges should 
be acknowledged as sources of conflict in cross-strait relations. In other words, cultural 
exchanges between Taiwan and China are not as simplistic and unproblematic as often is 
assumed and need to be carefully examined.   
4. Discourses at play 
This chapter shows that the Chinese ‘One China’ discourse, the Taiwanese ‘One China’ 
discourse and the ‘Taiwan-centric’ discourse, constructed by the CCP, KMT and DPP, 
respectively, compete to define culture for political purposes. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Cultural Exchanges  
NPM - PM  
Cooperation Contestation
 
 
Analyse 
Cultural Discourses 
Chinese 
'One 
China'
CCP
Taiwanese 
'One 
China'
KMT
Taiwanese
'Taiwan-
centric'
DPP
Figure 3: Complexity of cross-strait cultural exchanges  
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Figure 3 illustrates that cross-strait cultural exchanges are not as straightforward and 
unproblematic as is often assumed. Whether these cultural exchanges will result in 
cooperation or contestation is difficult to pinpoint due to competing, interacting and 
overlapping discourses embedded in the exchanges between in this case the NPM and the PM. 
This figure indicates that the collaborations between the NPM and PM do not necessarily or 
simply lead to enhanced cross-strait cooperation and may also cause contestation between 
China and Taiwan and in Taiwan (DPP vs. KMT).  
  In an attempt to understand the complexity of cultural exchanges it is useful to point 
out the various discourses competing to conceptualise culture in the ROC and PRC for 
political purposes. While the CCP has emphasised common Chinese culture as it has 
reunification as its goal, the KMT and the DPP have shaped culture differently as their 
objective is to be distinct from Mainland China (albeit DPP on a more far-reaching scale). 
These three cultural discourses serve as building blocks for the next chapter, taking a closer 
look at presidential statements on culture and documentaries about the NPM to analyse the 
discourses and spatial representations embedded in the cultural exchanges between the NPM 
and the PM.  
  Taiwan’s culture and national identity have been constructed by interacting, 
intersecting and competing discourses that need further explanation (Hwang, 2014, p.78). The 
formation of Taiwan’s culture throughout history clearly indicates that culture is not stable, 
static nor interpreted in a homogenous fashion (Avruch, 1998, p.14-17). Between 1947 and 
1949, Chiang Kai-shek’s government and two million people fled from the Mainland to 
Taiwan (Chen, 2012, p.317; Moskowitz, 2011, p.2, 3).Yet, the KMT was convinced that it 
would regain the Mainland and reclaim sovereignty (Chen, 2012, p.317; Shih, 2012, p.11). To 
solidify its authoritative legitimacy over the Communists to rule China, the KMT government 
put a lot of effort in constructing and maintaining its self-image as the preserver of true 
traditional Chinese culture (Wang, 2014, p.36, 37). It was evident that Chinese culture was 
strongly politicised and purposefully constructed as a discourse to mean more than just 
sharing common language, customs and values. The KMT was committed to be “more 
Chinese than [Mainland] China” (Wang, 2014, p.36, 37).   
  This purposefully constructed image of the KMT and the ROC as caretakers of 
China’s traditional culture was strengthened and confirmed by highlighting the Nationalists’ 
role in protecting the richest collection of Chinese artefacts against the Japanese and later the 
communists (Shambaugh Elliott and Shambaugh, 2005, p.95-97). In 1948 and 1949, the most 
valuable Chinese cultural artefacts, originally housed in the Palace Museum in Beijing, were 
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shipped to Taiwan (ibid.). Furthermore, the NPM was of symbolic importance to the Chinese 
Cultural Renaissance Movement created by the KMT in 1967 to uphold Chinese culture in 
stark contrast to the Cultural Revolution taking place on the Mainland (Wang, 2014, p.37; 
Vickers, 2010, p.96). In China’s imperial past, emperors used to preserve collections of 
Chinese cultural artefacts that symbolised their authority (Watson, 1995, p.10). Likewise, the 
KMT relied on its self-constructed image as warden of Chinese traditional culture/ the NPM’s 
Chinese imperial collection, to claim cultural and political legitimacy and to establish the 
ROC as the true representative of China (ibid., Shambaugh Elliott and Shambaugh, 2005, 
p.95-97; Lee, 2007, p.178; Hamlish, 1995, p.22).  
  To add credibility to this claim the KMT had to make Chinese culture prominent in 
Taiwan (Moskowitz, 2011, p.2). KMT’s cultural discourse, also referred to as the Taiwanese 
‘One China’ discourse in this thesis, centralised Chinese culture and forced all inhabitants to 
adhere to Confucian moral values and communicate in Mandarin (Chun, 1994, p. 54-56). It 
was carefully plotted to permeate all aspects of Taiwanese life with constructed versions of 
knowledge and history in line with KMT’s nationalist political agenda (ibid.). The NPM 
served as a strategic instrument to promote Chinese culture, Chinese nationalistic feelings and 
a homogeneous Chinese society (Vickers, 2010, p.94; Huang, 2012, p.218-219). By 
“preserving” or, more appropriately, creating a genuine Chinese culture, community and 
nation, the KMT believed it could prove its legitimacy to govern China (Wang, 2014, p.36; 
Shih, 2012, p.14).  
  This official Han Chinese discourse silenced the Hakka, Hoklo and indigenous people 
who had been living in Taiwan long before the ROC resettled (Shih, 2012, p.12, 13). From the 
1970s on, the wider public and political debate signalled that the official ‘One China’ cultural 
discourse could no longer retain its grip on daily life (Wang, 2014, p.39). People in Taiwan 
started to show resentment against the Mainland’s sovereignty claim on the ROC and the 
KMT’s authoritarian governance (ibid. Hwang, 2014, p.68). This stimulated the development 
of a ‘Taiwan-centric’ discourse encouraging Taiwanese consciousness, emphasising Taiwan 
as a distinct independent community of people sharing a unique culture and identity, and 
shaped by distinct experiences under several centuries of colonial rule (Chang, 2004, p.3-6; 
Lynch, 2004, p.515; Wang, 2014, p.40).  
  Efforts to fuel this alternative consciousness were strongly repressed by the KMT as 
these posed challenges to the KMT’s cultural discourse, (Brown, 2004, p.11). Yet, as the 
government did not suppress the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 
1986, and martial law was lifted the next year, changes in the political climate were becoming 
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noticeable (ibid.). For many Chinese culture was no longer situated in the core of society and 
Taiwanese culture no longer on the periphery (Lynch, 2004, p.517). Furthermore, there were 
increasing collective demands for Taiwan to determine its own future democratically, 
independent from China (ibid.). These voices became too loud for the KMT to ignore; making 
amendments to its cultural discourse and recognition of Taiwanese culture as a local culture 
inevitable (Wang, 2014, p.41, 42; Chang, 2004, p.3).  
 In 2000, the DPP became the ruling party for the first time, signifying the shift away 
from Chinese cultural hegemony towards a hybrid Taiwanese culture embracing the ‘Four 
Great Ethnic Groups’, namely the Hoklo, Hakka, indigenous Aboriginals and the Mainlanders 
(Shih, 2012, p.20; Wang, 2014, p.44; Chang, 2004, p.4). This posed a serious challenge to the 
PRC as the DPP, contrary to the KMT, vigorously rejected Taiwan as part of the Chinese 
nation (Brown, 2004, p.2). While the DPP used to advocate de jure independence, this shifted 
to a less radical outlook, but still rejecting China’s claim over Taiwan. Accordingly, DPP’s 
‘Taiwan-centric’ cultural discourse, promotes Taiwan as a multicultural, democratic, high-
tech and globally competitive nation; culturally and in many other ways distinct from China 
(Chang, 2004, p.5). This change in cultural policy was reflected in the exhibitions that were 
organised at the NPM (Vickers, 2010, p.96). The museum’s focus was reoriented away from 
Chinese culture, towards Asian culture and Taiwanese multiculturalism (ibid.). In line with 
this development, the DPP initiated the establishment of a new NPM in the south of Taiwan 
that would distinguish itself from the NPM in Taipei as a museum of Asian art and culture 
(Huang, 2012, p.211-212). The so-called NPM Southern Branch (NPMSB) has become a 
battlefield for the KMT and DPP to fight their culture war (ibid. p.212). While proponents of 
the proposal argue that this museum enables the NPM collection to let go the Chinese 
nationalistic discourse, opponents stress that the NPM should not abandon its Chinese cultural 
roots (ibid. p.220).  
  In President Ma Ying-jeou’s 2008 inaugural address, KMT’s move away from pure 
Chinese nationalism was apparent as Ma spoke about the “build-up of our homeland 
[Taiwan]” and “putting Taiwan first for the benefit of the people” (Ma, 2008). Nevertheless, 
the KMT has never stopped associating Taiwan with the Mainland in terms of “common 
Chinese heritage” (ibid.). Additionally, President Ma and Chinese presidents emphasised 
Chinese culture as a binding factor in cross-strait relations (Ma, 2011; Bush, 2013, p.78, 79). 
Even so, Ma has always underlined that Chinese culture as preserved and promoted by the 
ROC is unique and reflective of “a Chinese culture with Taiwan characteristics” (Ma, 2011, 
2014). 
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  While cultural discourses have been challenged and reconstructed in Taiwan, the CCP 
continues to rely on the Chinese ‘One China’ discourse and the primordial argument that 
people on both sides of the Strait are the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation and share a 
common destiny bound by blood (Hu, 2008, 2012; Brown, 2004, p.24; Rigger, 1997, p.308, 
310). Similarly, the PRC uses the Chinese imperial collection as a metaphor for the Chinese 
nation; the imperial treasures housed in the PM in Beijing and the NPM in Taipei need to be 
reunified, just like the Chinese nation (Hamlish, 1995, p.20; Du and Qin, 2011d).  
  The museum collaborations promoted by the PRC and the ROC, predominantly 
focusing on shared Chinese traditional culture, have made those who do not identify 
themselves as Chinese feel excluded. Consequently, this form of exchange, intended to create 
mutual understanding between the opposite sides of the Strait, may be interpreted as growing 
Chinese influence and paradoxically heighten feelings of contestation among the Taiwanese 
public. The DPP criticised the growing China-centric cultural exchanges between the PRC 
and ROC as attempts by China to brainwash and push Taiwanese people towards unification 
(Wang, 2013). Moreover, the DPP complained that the KMT-led government put too little 
effort to promote Taiwanese culture in cross-strait cultural exchanges (ibid.). Yet, the 
continuous struggle between cultural discourses to define the “true” past, present and future 
will remain significant in Taiwanese society, no matter whether Chinese or Taiwanese 
consciousness dominates people’s daily lives or cross-strait cultural exchanges (Hwang, 2014, 
p.78). There will always be people who feel excluded or unrepresented by the hegemonic 
cultural discourse and demand a counter discourse to come to the fore. 
5. Competing meanings and purposes of culture 
The Chinese ‘One China’ discourse, Taiwanese ‘One China’ discourse and ‘Taiwan-centric 
discourse’ have all tied different meanings to culture and the Chinese imperial collection. Part 
of this collection was relocated to Taiwan due to the Chinese Civil War on the Mainland 
(Shambaugh Elliott and Shambaugh, 2005, p.95-97). In the end, it took sixty years for several 
pieces to be reunited. In October 2009, the NPM and the PM launched their first joint 
exhibition ‘Harmony and Integrity: The Yongzheng Emperor and His Times’ in Taipei (Sui, 
2009; Chou, 2010, p.125). NPM director Chou Kung-shin emphasised that not touching upon 
political issues facilitated the collaborations with the PM (ibid.). Likewise, Michelle Jana 
Chan (2010) remarked that the museum directors have risen above politics to organise a 
landmark exhibition.  
  Yet, this thesis contends that politics is firmly rooted in cross-strait exchanges. 
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Enhanced cooperation between the two museums was the very result of intensified KMT-CCP 
relations and a less tense political climate. Furthermore, Chinese and Taiwanese governments 
have both used culture to find common ground between the island and the Mainland, but also 
to distinguish Taiwan from China. This chapter analyses presidential statements on culture 
and documentaries about the NPM from a spatial perspective to explain how culture and the 
NPM are politicised and constructed through various discourses. Additionally, this research 
reveals instability and contradictions between discourses as they constantly challenge one 
another with competing assumptions, and within discourse as it relies on subjectively 
constructed differences in relation to the Other (Doty, 1993, p.302-303; Hansen, 2006, p.18; 
Jackson, 2007, p.396; Derrida, 1978, p.272). 
  Former President of China Hu Jintao (2003-2013) and President Xi Jinping (2013-
now), put a lot of effort in creating proximity between the PRC and the ROC. Hu and Xi 
showed understanding for the Taiwanese that have “their own mentality due to the island’s 
unique history and social environment” and love “their home and land” (Hu, 2008; Xinhua, 
2014). Yet, Hu (2008) underscored that this love or Taiwanese consciousness is compatible 
with “our [Chinese] national consciousness” and not synonymous with Taiwanese 
independence. Spatial representations were vital to metaphorically connect people on both 
sides and to create a sense of kinship, affinity and “common destiny” (Xinhua, 2015; Hu, 
2012). The Chinese Presidents relied heavily on first person plural pronouns such as “we” and 
“our” and addressed Taiwanese people as “our fellows”, “our Taiwan compatriots”, implying 
to be part of “us” (Hu, 2012; Xinhua, 2014, 2015). Jointly, the Chinese and Taiwanese were 
referred to as “common people”, “one family that share the same blood”, “we, the sons and 
daughter of the Chinese nation” (ibid.; Hu, 2008). Hu (2008) described Chinese culture as “a 
common and precious asset” strengthening “our national consciousness”, “common will” and 
“joint endeavour toward the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”.  
  Whereas this Chinese ‘One China’ discourse maintains that shared Chinese culture can 
build a bridge between people on both sides of the Strait and override Taiwanese Otherness, 
the Taiwanese ‘One China’ discourse and ‘Taiwan-centric’ discourse argue that culture alone 
cannot overcome these major political and societal differences (Xinhua, 2015; Chen, 2000; 
Ma, 2012). President Ma Ying-jeou (2008-now) said that gradual democratisation of China 
would be the true binding force between Taiwanese and Chinese people (2012). In the same 
vein, former DPP President Chen Sui-bian (2000-2008) stated that Chinese political reform 
was the only viable option to break “a wall of divisiveness and confrontation” (Chen, 2000). 
Moreover, the link between shared Chinese culture, common will and reunification is not as 
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strong as the CCP claims it to be. Although the Taiwanese ‘One China’ discourse underlines 
that people on both sides of the Strait share common blood, history and culture, Ma 
encourages the promotion of “Chinese culture with Taiwan characteristics” to “dazzle the 
world” and increase significance “in the Chinese-speaking world”, rather than reunifying the 
Chinese nation (Ma, 2008, 2011, 2012).  
  Another inconsistency within the Chinese ‘One China’ discourse can be found in the 
way the government and the PM deal with the Chinese imperial collection housed at the 
NPM. Since the CCP firmly beliefs Taiwan to be an inseparable part of the Chinese nation, 
“there is no such problem of the art being ‘returned’ [from the NPM] to China” (Sui, 2009). 
Therefore, it is peculiar that joint exhibitions between the PM and the NPM are organised by 
the Foreign Affairs Department of the PM, responsible for the communications and 
collaborations with foreign museums (PM, n.d.). Although the close link between the PM 
collection and the Chinese nation seems evident this has not always been the case. When the 
last Emperor was overthrown, the Chinese imperial collection he inherited was not 
immediately considered as symbolically significant for the Chinese nation (Hamlish, 1995, 
p.23). Instead, many government officials argued in 1928 that the emperor’s imperial 
collection was a reminder of the corrupt past and should not be preserved (ibid. p.25; Watson, 
1995, p.10). Eventually, the museum committee managed to persuade the ROC government 
that the imperial collection should be looked after as it is a national treasure that symbolises 
centuries of culture (ibid.).  
  In any case, the Nationalists were certainly convinced of the importance of the cultural 
relics for legitimacy over the Chinese nation when they moved the most valuable pieces of the 
collection to Taiwan in 1948 and 1949 (Shambaugh Elliott and Shambaugh, 2005, p.95-97). 
The NPM and the cultural relics were used by the KMT to confirm the self-constructed image 
of Taiwan and to strengthen the Taiwanese ‘One China’ discourse. Accordingly, Ma and other 
KMT presidents have regularly presented the ROC as “the standard-bearer at the leading edge 
of Chinese culture” as Taiwan “preserved the rich roots of Chinese culture” in stark contrast 
to the Cultural Revolution that took place in China (Ma, 2011). However, this discourse 
ignores that the Communist leaders Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai ordered troops to protect the 
PM’s treasures from being destroyed during the Cultural Revolution (Shambaugh Elliott and 
Shambaugh, 2005, p.127-130). While the Taiwanese ‘One China’ discourse portrays Taiwan 
as the protector of Chinese traditional culture, Taiwan only protected twenty percent of the 
PM collection that was moved to the south of China, the Mainland preserved the largest share 
of the artefacts (ibid. p.95-97; Lee, 2007, p.178; Hamlish, 1995, p.22). This information has 
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deliberately been silenced as this would challenge Taiwan’s reputation as a guardian of 
Chinese imperial art.  
  What is more, the Taiwanese ‘One China’ discourse represents Taiwan as a 
democratic, open and free society in contrast to an authoritarian and oppressive China. This 
message is conveyed implicitly by framing culture in Taiwan as Chinese culture with 
Taiwanese characteristics and by stating that democracy, civil society and freedom enable 
(Chinese) culture to truly blossom (Ma, 2012). Hu and Xi admitted that Taiwanese culture 
enriches Chinese culture; positioning Chinese culture in the centre and Taiwanese culture in 
the periphery (Hu, 2012; Xinhua, 2014, 2015). Conversely, the ‘Taiwan-centric’ discourse 
places Taiwanese culture in the centre and moves Chinese culture to the margin. Taiwanese 
culture is defined as a “pluralistic melting pot”, regarding Chinese culture as only one part of 
Taiwanese culture (Enav, 2007; Chen, 2000). Chen emphasised the distinctiveness of 
Taiwanese culture by distancing and juxtaposing Chinese culture as “continental” and 
Taiwanese culture as “oceanic” (Enav, 2007). Furthermore, he claimed that Taiwanese culture 
would cease to exist, and leave “a people without a culture or a country”, if it would lose its 
“Taiwan-centric quality” by just being “one of China’s marginal peripheral cultures” (ibid.).  
  Consistent with Chen’s statements about Taiwan’s pluralistic culture and society, one 
would expect Chen to speak about a Taiwanese community. Yet, Chen (2000) implicitly 
referred to Taiwan as a Chinese community by lauding its democracy as ground-breaking for 
other Chinese communities. This contradiction within the ‘Taiwan-centric’ discourse creates 
inconsistency and instability. Nonetheless, this concentration on Taiwan’s democracy shows 
similarities to the way Ma and the Taiwanese ‘One China’ discourse present Taiwan as a 
democratic and outward-looking nation forging close ties with other like-minded countries 
(ibid. Ma, 2011). Accordingly, Chen (2000) addressed people from democratic countries as 
“friends from all over the world who love democracy”. Moreover, the two Taiwanese 
Presidents both defined “our homeland” as Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu in contrast to 
what Hu and Xi believed to be the reunified Chinese nation (ibid; Ma, 2008).  
  What is interesting is that the Taiwanese ‘Taiwan-centric’ discourse and the ‘One 
China’ discourses use similar catchwords such as “our compatriots”, “march” or “move” 
“forward hand in hand” and “shared destiny” to build arguments and convey messages that 
are to some extent or completely at odds with one another (Chen, 2000; Hu, 2012; Xinhua, 
2014, 2015). Chen (2000) for instance talked about “our 23 million compatriots” referring to 
Taiwanese people only and highlighted Taiwan as “our eternal mother” and every citizen as a 
“child of Taiwan”. This is in sharp contrast to Hu’s definition of “motherland” and “the sons 
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and daughters of the Chinese nation” (Hu, 2008, 2012). These competing assumptions of what 
culture entails, and the spatial distance/proximity between China and Taiwan are embedded in 
cultural exchanges between the PRC and the ROC indicate signs of instability and 
contestation in cross-strait relations.  
  Museums serve as battlefields for these discourses and assumptions, each struggling to 
be heard and acknowledged (Kaplan, 2006, p.165; Dubin, 2006, p.478; McLean, 2005, p.1). 
China and Taiwan both recognise the NPM as an instrument to control and display meanings 
and purposes of culture, and to define power relations between the PRC and the ROC. This 
can be observed in two documentary films about the NPM produced from a CCP and a DPP 
perspective. The 24-part documentary series ‘Journeys in Time: Palace Museum in Taipei’ 
produced by CCTV, a popular state-owned television network, clearly depicts the Chinese 
‘One China’ discourse with a strong political undertone. The documentaries were aired not 
only in Chinese (2010) but also in English (2011) to reach a wider and global public. The 
content shows how the Chinese government perceives the NPM and defines its relationship 
with the museum and Taiwan in general. Viewers are reminded every commercial break that 
“90% of the collection in the Taipei PM came originally from Beijing’s own PM” (Du and 
Qin, 2011a). Also, they spoke of Taipei PM rather than the National PM and framed it as 
being one of the two PMs in China (ibid. 2011b).  
  Throughout the documentaries, the separated collection was repeatedly paralleled to 
the divided Chinese nation that needs to be reunified. The content, shaped according to the 
official Chinese discourse, displayed that the inseparable character of the PMs is evident as 
they are “linked together by flesh and blood”, similar to what Hu (2012) and Xi (2014) said 
about people on both sides sharing blood ties (Du and Qin, 2011f). What is more, the 
Mainland and the Chinese nation are presented as the “original” and “native homes” of the 
cultural relics and their escorts (ibid. 2011c, 2011d). Accordingly, it was stressed that those 
who safeguarded the artefacts for years would wish “to see the national treasures return to the 
PM in Beijing” or at least united and so does “the Chinese nation” (ibid. 2011d). Even so, PM 
director Zheng Xinmiao underscored that both museums diffuse “the culture of the Chinese 
nation” and strengthen the “sense of national identity” of Chinese people all over the world 
(ibid. 2011b). What these CCTV documentaries portray is that Chinese culture is deeply 
embedded in Taiwanese society and inextricably linked to the Chinese nation. Seemingly, 
Taiwanese people have all forged strong ties with the PM in Taipei, the embodiment of 
Chinese culture and spirit (ibid. 2011b, 2011e). This resembles Hu’s argument that Chinese 
culture should be enhanced on both sides of the Strait to enhance “[Chinese] national 
  s1484095 
18 
 
consciousness” and “common will”, referring to the Taiwan’s reunification with Mainland 
China (Hu, 2008).  
  On the other hand, the one-hour documentary film ‘Inside: The Emperor’s Treasure’ is 
highly representative of the ‘Taiwan-centric’ discourse (NPM, 2007). The National 
Geographic team, mainly consisting of an Australian producer, an American executive 
producer and an Austrian director, worked closely together with the NPM to create the film 
(ibid.). The documentary adopts a Taiwan-centric and global perspective and is aired in 166 
countries (NPM, 2007). The fact that the National Geographic produced the documentary 
helps to give the impression that the material provided is unbiased or at least less politicised/ 
value-laden as when the ROC would have produced it on its own. Nevertheless, the political 
nature of the NPM is undeniable as the museum is placed under the supervision of the 
Executive Yuan (Cabinet) (Chou, 2010, p.11). In addition, the NPM director is a member of 
the Executive Yuan and is indirectly appointed by the ROC president (Vickers, 2010, p.95; 
Executive Yuan, 2014). At the time of the documentary production, the ruling party and the 
ROC President (2007) were from the DPP and this has had substantial influence on the 
storyline and content.  
  In the film the NPM is displayed as the new modern home housing the cultural relics 
in a fully democratic environment, with no mention of the PM (Schutz, 2007). This implicitly 
distances the NPM from the PM, the old home where democracy has not taken root. 
Furthermore, multiple references are made to the world and no single mention of the Chinese 
nation (ibid.). NPM director Lin Mun-Lee labelled the NPM as “one of the world’s top 
museums” and its collection of Chinese cultural relics as “one of the world’s greatest 
collections of any kind of art” (ibid.). Parts of the Taiwanese ‘One China’ discourse can be 
recognised as these overlap with the ‘Taiwan-centric’ discourse. President Chen (2000) and 
Ma (2012) both agreed that Taiwan’s culture should be promoted to attract global attention 
and to seek closer ties with the international community. Hence, instead of enhancing the 
spirit of the Chinese nation and Chinese national consciousness, this documentary illustrates 
the NPM’s aspiration to reach a world audience by promoting a technologically advanced 
“new global culture” (Schutz, 2007). Similarly, Chen (2000) frequently described Taiwan as 
an outward-looking, high-tech, innovative and “sustainable green silicon island”. 
  Furthermore, the film touches upon the National Palace Museum Southern Branch 
(NPMSB) established in the south of Taiwan (and initiated by the DPP) (Schutz, 2007; 
Huang, 2012, p.211-212). In sharp contrast to the NPM and the PM, Asian culture, rather than 
Chinese culture, will take centre stage in this new branch (Schutz, 2007). This development is 
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destined to challenge the statement that the PMs diffuse “the culture of the Chinese nation” 
and strengthen the “sense of [Chinese] national identity” (Du and Qin, 2011b). Actually, the 
DPP already challenged this statement by altering the vision and mission of the NPM. In the 
museum’s 2007 annual report, director Lin Mun-lee highlighted the NPM’s goal to share the 
pluralistic and multicultural qualities of its artefacts with people from all over the world; 
removing the common emphasis on the Chinese imperial collection (Lin, 2008, p.8). 
Following on from this, the NPMSB does not only cover multicultural Taiwan but also 
multicultural Asia “to develop a broader global view” (ibid. p.113). The new museum, 
scheduled to open on the 28th of December this year, has become a battlefield for the KMT 
and DPP to fight their culture war (Huang, 2012, p.212). While proponents of the proposal 
argue that this museum enables the NPM collection to let go the Chinese nationalistic 
discourse, opponents stress that the NPM should not abandon its Chinese cultural roots (ibid. 
p.220). Thus, one could call the ‘Taiwan-centric’ discourse a counter-hegemonic discourse 
that is becoming increasingly prominent in Taiwanese society.  
6. Conclusion 
This thesis shows that the conceptualisation of culture rooted in cross-strait cultural 
exchanges reveals power struggles between Chinese and Taiwanese political parties and also 
between the KMT and the DPP. The analysis on presidential statements on culture and 
documentaries about the NPM demonstrates the power of Chinese ‘One China’ discourse, 
Taiwanese ‘One China’ discourse and ‘Taiwan-centric’ discourse to influence the narrative 
taken and statements made on culture and shows how culture and the Chinese imperial 
collection are used for diverse political ends. Each discourse constructs different, but to some 
extent overlapping, meanings of what Taiwanese or Chinese culture entails and what the 
ultimate purpose of this culture is. These politicised and different sets of meanings and 
assumptions compete to be acknowledged. Since many journalists and scholars considered 
cultural exchanges between the PRC and the ROC to be uncontroversial and unproblematic, 
the contested nature of cultural exchanges often remains underexposed.  
  Growing collaboration between the PM and the NPM have required both sides to 
define, present and promote Chinese and Taiwanese culture in a certain fashion. Spatial 
representations played a significant role in constructing these varying meanings and purposes 
of culture and describe the underlying relationship between China and Taiwan, ranging from 
close to distant in relation to the Self. Yet, a slight sense of Otherness can be enough to spur 
tensions and reveal different views; views that may or may not be compatible with those 
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shaped by other discourses. These disagreements about the meaning and purpose of Chinese 
culture and Taiwan’s culture are destined to give rise to tension and contestation in cross-
strait relations. As Foucault (1991b) and Derrida (2003) pointed out meaning and knowledge 
cannot be established without power and power struggles (p.93; in Devetak, 2005, p.167). 
  This continuous battle between cultural discourses to define the “true” past, present 
and future will remain significant in Taiwanese society, no matter whether Chinese or 
Taiwanese consciousness dominates people’s daily lives or cross-strait cultural exchanges 
(Hwang, 2014, p.78). There will always be people who feel excluded or unrepresented by the 
hegemonic cultural discourse and demand a counter discourse to come to the fore. According 
to spatiality, a discourse is necessarily relationally constituted, meaning that boundaries need 
to be constructed to define positions ranging from close to distant, centre to periphery and 
insider to outsider (Hansen, 2006, p.52, 58). In this sense, contestation between the CPP, 
KMT and DPP regarding the constructed relational positions seem inevitable. This study 
contends that competing meanings and purposes of culture embedded in these politicised 
cultural exchanges, each describing the power relations between Taiwan and China, the roles 
of Taiwan and China, what is appropriate and legitimate, should be acknowledged as sources 
of conflict in cross-strait relations. 
  Analysis exposed the contradictions and instabilities within the Chinese and 
Taiwanese ‘One China’ discourses. Pure Chinese nationalist discourses are increasingly 
losing appeal, support and influence as its assumptions do not seem to match with Taiwanese 
social reality and public demand. On the other hand, the ‘Taiwan-centric’ discourse seems to 
become increasingly prominent. This discourse stands in stark opposition to the Chinese ‘One 
China’ discourse and these two discourses are expected to reveal conflicts when interacting. 
Hitherto, official exchanges between the NPM and the PM have never taken place under DPP-
CCP cooperation. Yet, there is a realistic chance that the DPP will win the upcoming 
presidential election in 2016. As the growing cultural exchanges between the PMs will 
probably not come to a standstill, it would be interesting to research whether exchanges 
between the NPMSB and the PM will take root and if the peripheral role assigned to Chinese 
culture will be tolerable for the PM and the Chinese government.  
  The NPMSB can be seen as an embodiment of a counter-hegemonic discourse 
resisting the ‘One China’ discourses. This new museum shows that the meaning of culture, 
and the relational positions it prescribes between China and Taiwan, are changing in Taiwan. 
Moreover, it demonstrates that voices that were once silenced and ignored by discourses can 
end up being acknowledged at some point. Whereas the Taiwanese ‘One China’ discourse 
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was initially characterised by its Chinese-centric focus, the KMT eventually ended up 
embracing Taiwan’s distinctiveness (Chang, 2004, p.3; Lynch, 2004, p.515). Currently, the 
DPP seems to be winning this culture war with the NPMSB as one of its battlegrounds. 
  While the scope of this research is limited to cultural exchanges between the NPM and 
the PM, three discourses and spatiality as an analytical tool, this is just one way of conducting 
discourse analysis. Other analytical research elements such as temporality and ethicality are 
also relevant in this study (Jarvis, 2008; Hansen, 2006; Chilton, 2004). A focus on 
representations of temporality such as discontinuity, linearity, and stasis, or representations of 
ethicality such as responsibility and righteousness would provide alternative angles to the 
study on the construction of competing meanings of culture (ibid.). This thesis is not meant to 
be read as “the truth” but rather as a self-interpreted analysis of various interpretations. 
Beyond doubt, there are more cultural exchanges and discourses that deserve attention. 
Unfortunately, it would go beyond the scope of this research to include all these aspects. Field 
research would absolutely add value to this study, but the lack of formal Chinese language 
skills and financial means have made this too challenging. Yet, all these limitations offer 
possibilities for others to engage in future research.     
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